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To the editor,
Ten years ago, I was accused of scientific misconduct 
regarding a paper (Ehlers et al. 2009) that I wrote with five 
colleagues for the British Medical Journal, which showed 
that a national screening programme for men aged 65 years 
for abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) in Denmark was not 
cost effective. In the following years, I was heavily criticised 
by certain Danish media outlets. One newspaper headline 
that I particularly remember was as follows: ‘Lars Ehlers is 
responsible for more than 2000 deaths each year’. A number 
of peer-reviewed papers also tried to discredit Ehlers et al. 
(2009) paper, and one of those papers (Ploug et al. 2014) 
was published in your journal.
Even though many years have passed, I still think that it is 
relevant for the readers of this journal to highlight errors and 
misunderstandings in earlier papers. In this letter, I hope to 
explain why so many years have passed before I responded 
to the aforementioned criticisms. Firstly, it is important to 
note that, as part of a public health technology assessment 
(HTA) organisation in 2009, I followed instructions from 
my managers not to engage in the public debate about AAA 
screening in Denmark. Now, 10 years later, I am no longer 
employed by that HTA organisation; thus, I am free to speak 
out.
The points of contention include the following: Ploug 
et al. (2014) argued that Ehlers et al. (2009) paper was not 
a ‘neutral’ scientific analysis but was rather ‘a deliberate 
attempt to influence decision makers in ways that are similar 
to popular “nudging” techniques’. They also argued that the 
paper ‘played a key role in the political decision process’ not 
to implement AAA screening in Denmark.
Both of these suggestions are incorrect. The paper was 
only a biproduct of an official Danish HTA report that had 
been published 1 year prior. That HTA report from 2008 
played a key role in the decision process (as it should), while 
Ehlers et al. (2009) paper did not. Instead, it was a scientific 
contribution.
The order of events was as follows: in 2007, structural 
reform in Denmark closed down 13 Danish counties and 
formed five new organisational entities (called regions), 
which were responsible for the public health care system. 
Some years before this, a decision had been made in the 
former Viborg County to introduce the AAA screening pro-
gramme for men. The investments and preparations for this 
screening programme had already begun when, in 2007, 
the new healthcare management team decided to put this on 
hold. They demanded a new HTA report as input for a new 
decision process about whether to introduce this screening 
programme in the larger geographical area of the Central 
Denmark Region.
It was an unfortunate situation for the cardiovascular 
surgeons in Viborg, whose professional research carrier 
and personal investments were suddenly jeopardised. Their 
interest in using political means to ‘nudge’ the decision was 
understandable. The cardiovascular surgeons from Viborg 
involved the Danish Society of Cardiovascular Surgery, and 
this interest organisation led the personal accusations of sci-
entific misconduct and were strongly involved in the public 
debate in Denmark. For obvious political reasons, they did 
not accuse the official HTA report but rather Ehlers et al. 
(2009) paper. In addition, for the same political reasons, they 
created the story that the economic findings in Ehlers et al. 
(2009) paper were responsible for the political decision not 
to introduce AAA screening in Denmark.
In 2007, the task of producing the HTA report was 
handed to the HTA organisation in the Central Denmark 
Region. As an employee of this organisation, it was my job 
to perform an economic evaluation (because an initial review 
had found no good economic evidence that was relevant for 
Denmark). HTA organisations exist all around the world to 
provide unbiased evidence to help decision makers in health 
care. The HTA organisation in the Central Denmark Region 
was part of the national network of HTA organisations and 
a part of the international HTAi community, which has a 
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strong identity as a part of an evidence-based medicine 
movement for the benefit of citizens and patients. At no 
point in my career as an HTA advisor did I observe either 
my managers or any other political party trying to ‘nudge’ 
results from economic evaluations or other HTA findings in 
any direction.
Ploug et al. (2014) compared key input values from the 
economic model in Ehlers et al. (2009) paper with other evi-
dence found in the literature. They used this comparison as 
proof of deliberate choices that were made with the purpose 
of influencing policy. In addition, they stated that Ehlers 
et al. (2009) paper did not ‘include the full range of relevant 
values found in the literature’, and ‘… no methodological or 
theoretical justification is offered for the choices’.
For context, one must consider that Denmark lacks a long 
tradition in health economic evaluation, such as what is seen 
in, for example, the UK. Physicians and economists in Den-
mark are generally not educated in the science of health 
economic evaluation, and there is a widespread misunder-
standing about the concepts of cost effectiveness, QALY and 
modelling, even among high-positioned decision makers in 
health care. Notably, Ploug et al. (2014) are also not experts 
in health economic evaluation.
Ehlers et  al. (2009) paper followed the international 
guidelines for good modelling practice and applied recom-
mended model validation methods (Weinstein et al. 2003; 
Philips et al. 2006). Based on a systematic literature search, 
and in a dialogue with the HTA group, all input values for 
the economic model were chosen as a set of assumptions, 
which—together as a mathematical model—were able to 
reproduce Danish incidence data for the annual number of 
ruptures, elective surgeries and different causes of deaths 
(Bech et al. 2008). The cardiovascular surgeons from Viborg 
were a part of the process of selecting the relevant input 
values for the Danish model, but they unfortunately left the 
HTA group when they saw the model’s results. If input val-
ues had instead been chosen from the literature without such 
a validation process, as suggested by Ploug et al. (2014), 
then the problem of ruptures and deaths would have been 
vastly overestimated and the value of a screening programme 
would have been significantly overrated.
The validation methods in Ehlers et al. (2009) paper were 
described (Ehlers et al. 2009; Bech et al. 2008), and the 
model was made publicly available on the Internet. As a part 
of the HTA process, a review of former economic evalua-
tions of AAA screening was also performed and published 
in English (Ehlers et al. 2008). Other parts of the model’s 
validation included statistical testing of relevant DRG tariffs 
as estimates of the costs of surgical treatment (Christensen 
et al. 2010; Ehlers 2010) and quality of life values after 
surgery (Ehlers et al. 2011). Therefore, Ploug et al. (2014) 
incorrectly argued that ‘… no methodological or theoretical 
justification is offered for the choice of only three out of six 
categories (of Danish DRG tariffs)’. All these studies were 
published in scientific journals as biproducts of the publica-
tion of the HTA report, including the paper by Ehlers et al. 
(2009). Ploug et al. (2014) also argued that social, ethical 
and organisational issues were ignored in the Danish deci-
sion process; however, this is also a misunderstanding. The 
HTA report was structured to provide answers to the World 
Health Organization’s criteria for screening programmes 
(Wilson and Junger 1967), and all issues were analysed via 
scientific methods. Thus, all issues played a key role in the 
Danish decision process. Furthermore, a series of presen-
tations and discussions between politicians, administrators 
and researchers were scheduled as a part of the political 
decision process regarding AAA screening in the Central 
Denmark Region. This included representatives from the 
HTA organisation, the surgeons from Viborg as well as 
other experts in screening (e.g. from the Nordic Cochrane 
Centre). Rather than providing proof of nudging in Ehlers 
et al. (2009) paper, Ploug et al. (2014) showed that they were 
nudged to falsely believe that there was something wrong 
with the Danish decision process. Specifically, Ehlers et al. 
(2009) paper was the scapegoat that they were nudged to 
criticise in public.
The final sentence in the paper by Ploug et al. (2014) is a 
recommendation that decision makers should be much more 
critical in their appropriation of scientific advice. Sadly, 
since 2009, the HTA in Denmark has suffered tremendous 
setbacks. To my knowledge, we are currently the only Euro-
pean country without a national HTA programme to produce 
evidence-based decision support in healthcare. In 2009, a 
letter that was signed by all Danish professors in health 
economics was sent to The Danish Committee of Scientific 
Dishonesty, which supported the HTA’s methods for eco-
nomic evaluation that were used in Ehlers et al. (2009), and 
they argued that the trial should be dismissed. The Danish 
Committee of Scientific Dishonesty disregarded this letter, 
and the trial ran for 3 years before it was finally dismissed. 
The Danish Governmental HTA funding programme was 
officially closed in 2011.
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